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Reforming the rape offence 
in Norwegian criminal law
JØRN JACOBSEN, MAY-LEN SKILBREI *
1. Introduction
The last few years have seen ongoing discussions about whether to revise the legal 
definition of the offence of rape in the Nordic countries, as has occurred in other 
regions as well. Sweden and Iceland have already carried out reforms, Denmark appears 
to be on the verge of reform, while the issue continues to be debated in Norway and 
Finland.1 While the many similarities between the Nordic countries’ legal orders and 
criminal law might suggest a common Nordic approach to reform of the rape offence,2 
beyond the surface, several differences suggest that a more cautious approach should 
be taken.3 Important differences exist in the historical developments that have led 
up to the contemporary, diverging national laws of sexual offences, and punishment 
levels vary considerably across the region; Norway, for instance, has a comparatively 
high sanctioning level for rape. The role of victims in procedural law and policy debate 
also diverges greatly throughout the region. While these differences may suggest a 
variety of starting points for the reform debate in the different countries, debates 
across the region also have a history of affecting each other, as we will return to below. 
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In this article we explore the content, context, and development of the Norwegian 
rape offence in order to frame the particular background and features of the country’s 
reform discussions. As we will describe below, the legal definition of rape has changed 
several times, but there is still considerable criticism towards both the definition of the 
offence and how the current offence is implemented. The article aims to explain and 
contextualise contemporary discussions on change of the rape offence. While there 
exists literature that addresses Norwegian rape offence, this has typically represented 
either legal or socio-legal perspectives. This article bridges different perspectives, past 
and present, to bring forward our understanding of the drivers of and challenges 
to reform of rape offence. Further, most of what has been written about Norwegian 
rape offence has been published in Norwegian, and this article aims to communicate 
information about and insights into the Norwegian case to an international audience. 
The background for the debate over the rape offence is that while many forms of 
crime are decreasing in Norway, as is the case throughout most of Europe,4 reported 
cases of rape are on a rise.5 It is likely that important reasons for this rise are the higher 
propensity to report due to increasing awareness of victimisation and the legitimacy 
of victims, as well as how lower legal thresholds have been established as legislation 
has changed over time. Increasing levels of reporting challenge policy makers, as 
conviction rates are argued to be too low. Many cases of rape go unreported, but 
even when they are reported, few cases result in convictions: a discrepancy in the 
literature discussed in terms of the ‘justice gap’.6 In general, there appears to be a 
broad consensus, both within the criminal justice system, in politics and in the public 
debate, about sexual offences being a significant social problem and that the criminal 
justice system today does not provide victims of rape justice and sufficient protection. 
However, opinions are divided as to whether reform of the rape offence is the solution. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a description 
of the (mainly recent) history of the rape offence in Norway, with section. 3 describing 
how the current rape offence is constructed. After the presentation of the current state 
of the law, we provide some reflections on recent and ongoing reform discussions in 
Norway in light of the broader political and societal perspectives on rape (section 4). 
We first discuss how the debate on the rape offence has developed in the criminal-
policy context before presenting how the same questions are debated in the broader 
societal context. We end the article with a few viewpoints on the way forward for 
4 Gruszczyńska and Heiskanen, Trends in police-recorded offenses at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century in Europe, 24 Eur J Crim Policy Res (2018) pp. 37–53 <https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10610-018-9370-9>
5 Police statistics show a marked increase in police-reported rapes in Norway in the last few 
years. A total of 1,758 rapes were reported in 2018, which represents an increase of 44.5% since 
2014. See the Ministry of Justice and Public Security - Handlingsplan mot voldtekt [2019–2022] 
[Action plan against rape]. 
6 Temkin and Krahé, Sexual assault and the justice gap: a question of attitude (Hart Publishing 
2008) p. 1.
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Norwegian law in the case of rape (sect. 5).
2. The history of Norwegian rape law 
One starting point for understanding the contemporary rape offence and its related 
debates is the historical development of sexual offences in Norwegian criminal law.7 
The idea of considering sexual offences as specific forms of crimes can be traced back 
to King Christian V’s Norwegian law from 1678, not least influenced by canon law. 
Sexual offences later became separate parts of the codes of 1842 and 1902, with the latter 
in force until it was replaced by the code of 2005 on 1 October 2015.8 The code of 1902 
is the key to our subject. Chapter 19 of that code was concerned with sexual crimes, 
while chapter 38 was concerned with sexual misdemeanour, which reflects a general 
distinction that was applied to differentiate between serious and less serious crimes.9 
Chapter 19 contained a broad set of offences, including the rape offence. When enacted 
in 1902, this offence was limited to cases where the offender had ‘forced’ the victim, 
which required the use of violence and/or that the offender had threatened the victim, 
leading to fear for his or her  life or serious damage to health. While this approach was 
in line with the previous legislation, the code of 1902 represented the starting point of 
a slow but steady expansion of the rape offence that has led to the current situation.
The code of 1902 implied several significant changes compared to the previous 
legislation. Whereas previous legislation only considered women as victims of rape, 
sect. 192 of the 1902-code was gender-neutral and did not discriminate between 
men and women in the wording of the offence, even if the preparatory works still 
considered wrongdoings against women as clearly more serious than against men.10 
This was in a sense the beginning of a long process to make the criminal law gender 
7 On the historical development of the rape offence, see Frøberg,Til det rettslige 
voldtektsbegrepets genealogi [On the genealogy of the legal concept of rape] in Rettssikker 
radikaler: Festskrift til Ståle Eskeland, eds. Torgersen, Schea and Høgberg (Cappelen Akademisk 
forlag 2013) pp. 31–56.
8 The fact that the code did not take effect before in 2015, ten years after the code was enacted 
raises eyebrows. Several factors contributed to this unusual timespan. The code that was 
enacted in 2005 included the general part of the code, but few offences, which were added to 
the code in 2010. After that it was apparently a conflict over police IT-systems that prevented 
the code from taking effect, see further Jacobsen and Sandvik, An Outline of the New 
Norwegian Criminal Code, 3 Bergen Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice (2015) pp 162-
183, at. pp. 165-166. 
9 This outlook relates to the rejection of the idea of ‘police offences’ in favour of a distinction 
between major and minor crimes within the criminal law; see Jacobsen, Gjensyn med 
kriminalretten? [The return of criminal law?] in Rettslige overgangsformer: politi- og 
kriminalrett i nordisk rettsutvikling, eds. Heivoll and Flaatten (Akademisk publ. 2017) pp. 284–
325.
10 See e.g. Straffelovkommisjonens innstilling av 1896 (law comitee report). Udkast til Almindelig 
borgerlig Straffelov for Kongeriget Norge. II. Motiver, p. 176 and also Frøberg 2013 pp. 36-37. 
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neutral.
As for which kind of sexual activity constituted rape, to earlier legislation (prior to 
1902) only vaginal intercourse could constitute rape. The commission preparing the 
1902 code emphasised that this definition meant that indictment in many cases had 
to be limited to attempted rape, even if ‘the offender achieved what he sought’.11 Cases 
where the offender had acted in a sexual manner comparable to vaginal intercourse – 
what would later often be referred to as ‘substitutes for intercourse’ – were therefore 
considered to be rape, including anal or oral intercourse, masturbation, and rubbing 
the penis against the victim’s back or between her thighs, as well as cases where 
the offender masturbates and ejaculates in the victim’s face or over her breasts. 
Generally, all cases involving more than the very brief and light touching of genitals 
were now to be considered rape. This change also initiated an important change in 
the terminology. Intercourse and substitutes for intercourse were termed utuktig 
omgang, later seksuell omgang, a direct translation of which is sexual interaction; 
the English translation of the 2005 code is sexual activity.12 While the offences 
themselves lacked individual labels, the most common term was voldtekt (rape).
For rape to be committed, the offence required that the perpetrator acted with intent 
(forsett). Here it should however be noted that the Norwegian doctrine of intent 
differs from for instance intent in Anglo-American criminal law. Compared to the 
general Anglo-American distinction between intent, recklessness and negligence, 
the Norwegian doctrine is split in two – intent and negligence – whereof the former 
may include instances of recklessness: In addition to intentional acts in a strict sense, 
i.e., where the offender uses force in order to achieve sexual intercourse against the 
victim’s will, Norwegian criminal law also treats cases where the offender considers 
the relevant facts as probable (more likely than not, i.e. more than 50%) as intentional. 
For instance, a man and a woman are in bed, naked and kissing. The man wants 
to have intercourse and, using his body weight (and hence uses force according to 
the low threshold applied here, which we will return to), he spreads her thighs and 
penetrates her vagina. Now, if she does not want to have intercourse and he is aware 
of that, this is a clear-cut case of rape according to Norwegian criminal law. But he is 
also guilty of rape if he considers it more probable than not (more than 50 % likely) 
that she does not want to have intercourse with him. In addition to intent (in a strict 
sense) and probability, a third option for intent was established during the life span of 
the 1902-code in Supreme court practice: Even if the offender in the example above 
(wrongly) believed that the woman wanted to have sex, he would be guilty of rape if 
11 Udkast til almindelig borgerlig Straffelov for Kongeriget Norge. II: Motiver. Utarbeidet af den 
ved kgl.  Resolution af 14de November 1885 nedsatte Kommission (Kristiania 1896) p. 175. 
(draft of the Penal code 1885)
12 The term ‘sexual’ replaced in 2000 the term ‘utugtig’, the latter corresponding to the English 
term ‘lewd’, see further Ertzeid, Straffeloven § 192 om voldtekt: et supplement til pensum i 
spesiell strafferett [Penal code § 192 on rape: an addition to the syllabus on the offences in 
criminal law], 41 Jussens Venner (2007) pp. 337–371, p. 341. 
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he considered the possibility that she did not, and decided for himself to carry out 
the intercourse even if this was the case (often called ‘positive dolus eventualis’).13 Later 
on, as we will return to, criminalisation also of negligent rape was to be introduced.
When enacted in 1902, the rape offence in sect. 192 was supplemented by a series 
of other offences, including a separate offence for cases where the victim of the 
unwanted sexual activity lacked the capacity to oppose the sexual activity performed 
by the offender.14 This concerned e.g. cases where the victim was mentally ill or 
for similar reasons had mental deficits. Covered were also for instance cases of 
deception. Both were considered less serious crimes than rape. Another offence 
targeted acts that were of a sexual nature but were not serious enough to qualify 
as ‘sexual activity’. The use of force was not a requirement for this offence: required 
was only that the act had been carried out without the victim’s consent. Another 
awkward term was later used for the acts covered by this offence: seksuell handling 
(sexual acts), which we will return to later. It is not the word itself that is odd but 
rather that such a broad term was used for such a narrow subject, i.e., the least 
serious cases of physical sexual contact. Thus, strictly speaking, intercourse, oral sex 
and masturbation were (and are still) not ‘sexual acts’ in Norwegian criminal law.
 
The original chapter on sexual offences was to become subject to several reforms 
during the 20th century, the first of which occurred in 1927 when for instance the 
minimum punishment for rape was raised from one to three years’ imprisonment. 
The wording of the offence remained however the same until the turn of the 
millennium. The process leading to the new criminal code was initiated in 1978, 
although the new criminal code would have to travel a long and winding road 
before its implementation. This slow process came to affect sexual offences, which 
for political reasons in a sense ‘jumped the queue’. The Penal Code Commission 
(henceforth PCC) submitted general white papers both in 1983 and in 1992, 
with more to follow, but without significant progress. But because sexual offences 
were prominent on the political agenda in the 1990s, the Norwegian Parliament 
called for reform of such offences.15 The Sexual Offences Commission (SOC) was 
therefore appointed as a sub-commission of the PCC, resulting in a new white 
paper.16 A distinct feature of the SOC was its composition, with a female leader and 
13 These three forms of intent are now codified in the criminal code of 2005, sect. 22, see further 
Gröning, Husabø and Jacobsen, Frihet, forbrytelse og straff – En systematisk framstilling av 
norsk strafferett [‘Freedom, crime and punishment – A systematic outline of Norwegian 
criminal law’] 2nd ed. (Bergen 2019) pp. 226-236.
14 See Hagerup, Almindelig borgerlig straffelov af 22 Mai 1902 og lov om dens ikrafttræden af 
samme dato – udgivet med oplysende anmærkninger og henvisninger [‘General penal code 
of 22nd of May and law on effectuation – published with comments and references’] (H. 
Aschehoug & Co. 1903) p. 166 ff.
15 See Parliamentary decision of 12 June 1995, calling for effectuating a revision of the sexual 
offences, in line with Innst. S. nr. 106 (1994–95). 
16 NOU 1997: 23: Seksuallovbrudd (preparatory work on sexual offences).
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a total of four female and two male members. In contrast, the PCC was led by a 
man when it delivered NOU 1992: 2, and only one of the six members was female.
 
A broader and more nuanced take on these offences was suggested in the SOC’s white 
paper. The members of the SOC considered different alternatives, but the majority 
proposed neither a reform of the rape offence, a specific offence for sexual activity 
without consent, nor the criminalisation of grossly negligent rape; a minority did 
have different views. But the Ministry of Justice and the Police had its own view on 
these issues and delivered a proposal for reform in the government proposal Ot.prp. 
nr. 28 (1999–2000). Prior to 2000, the rape offence still required that the offender had 
threatened the victim, leading to fear for his or her life or serious damage to health, 
while other less serious threats was covered by (the less serious offence in) sect. 191 
first paragraph. This requirement of a fear for life or serious damage to health was 
removed in the 2000 reform, which meant that the rape offence now would include 
cases previously regulated by sect. 191 first paragraph.17 With this change, virtually any 
kind of threatening behaviour could be sufficient for an act to be considered as rape. 
At the same time, the general requirement of the victim being ‘forced’ was removed, as 
the Ministry of Justice and the Police considered that the requirement added nothing 
to the ‘violence or threatening behaviour’ criterion. A particularly important change 
for our subject was that cases where the victim fully lacked the capacity to resist the 
offender’s sexual activity was moved into the rape offence category, this time from the 
previous sect. 193 first paragraph, and was thereby considered to be as serious as other 
kinds of rape. Finally, the Ministry of Justice and the Police proposed, in line with the 
minority of the SOC, the criminalisation of grossly negligent rape in a separate offence.
 
Later in the legislative process, the Supreme Court decided on a case that gained 
a great deal of attention. In this case, referred in Rt. 1999.1718, a girl was forced 
to penetrate herself with objects, albeit without having been physically touched 
by the offenders.18 The majority considered that the current rape offence could 
not be interpreted to cover cases where victims were forced to perform sexual 
activity on themselves. This judgement initiated a process which resulted 
in a new alternative being added to the rape offence to cover such cases.19 
The more specific implications of these changes will be clarified in the next section: 
the 2000 reform took place several years before the new criminal code entered into 
force, so changes were made in the 1902 code. These changes also provided the 
starting point for the new code. In addition to this development of the wording of the 
offence, the level of punishment has also developed, with the minimum punishment 
for rape involving intercourse being a central issue. It was first reduced, before it in 
17 For more on the law of rape after the 2000 reform, see Ertzeid 2007 pp. 337–371.
18 “Rt.” is an abbreviation for Retstidende, the journal for Supreme Court judgements.
19  See further Ertzeid 2007 pp. 352-353.
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2010 again was increased, then from two to three years.20 
To summarise what we have covered so far, the trend has been step-by-step expansion 
of the rape offence.21 The Norwegian rape offence has thus been subjected to a series of 
changes that have reflected and created shifts in how the act of rape is defined, but the 
changes also reflect evolving ideas about the harm that rape causes to victims. When 
viewed together, these changes imply a broad reform of the rape offence, although that 
was not the general plan of the reformers who took these different steps along the way. 
3. The current rape offence outlined
The current rape offence, now explicitly titled rape - voldtekt, is covered in the 2005 
code sect. 291.22 The offence contains three subsections, (a), (b) and (c), where 
subsection (a) contains two alternatives: sexual activity achieved by the use of violence 
or threatening behaviour. Subsection (b) contains the alternative mentioned above 
for cases where the victim fully lacks the capacity to resist the sexual activity. While 
sexual activity is required in all situations, subsection (c) was specifically designed as 
an extension to subsection (a) for cases where victims are forced to perform such acts 
on themselves or with a third person, meaning that the offender is not (physically) 
involved in the sexual activity.
 
The violence requirement in subsection (a) is extensive and covers all forms of 
the use of physical force against the victim. The requirement includes acts such 
as beating and/or strangling the victim, as well as such acts as lying on top of 
somebody and using one’s body to control the victim’s body or holding the victim 
around the waist and tearing off the victims’s clothes. What counts as violence is also 
relative to the victim’s age and character. Less use of force against a young person 
is required for an act to constitute rape, but because a separate rape offence now 
covers all cases of sexual activity involving children under the age of 14 (sect. 299, 
see further below), this ’relative’ character of the violence criterion is less important 
20 Cfr. Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008-2009) p. 228 (preparatory work).
21 For a discussion, see Høgberg and Salomonsen, Voldtektslovgivning på ville veier? Straffeloven 
§ 192 [‘The legislation on rape on the wrong track? The criminal code § 192’], 10 Tidsskrift for 
strafferett (2010) pp. 210–252.
22 The following outline is based on the discussions in Jacobsen, Valdtektsstraffebodet: 
gjeldande rett og spørsmålet om reform [‘The rape offence: Current law and the question 
of reform’] (Fagbokforlaget, 2019) and Jacobsen, Seksualforbrytelsene [The law of sexual 
offences] in Forbrytelser i utvalg – straffelovens regler om voldsforbrytelser, seksualforbrytelser, 
formuesforbrytelser og narkotikaforbrytelser, eds. Jacobsen, Husabø, Gröning and Strandbakken 
(Fagbokforlaget 2020) pp. 95-157, see in particular pp. 112-128. See also Matningsdal, 
Straffeloven: lov 20 mai 2005 nr. 28 om straff: de straffbare handlingene, kapittel 17–31: 
kommentarutgave [‘The Penal Law: Law of 20th May 2005 nr. 28 on punishment: the criminal 
acts, chapter 17-31, commentary’] (Universitetsforlaget 2017) pp. 665–738. 
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than before. The ‘threatening behaviour’ criterion includes such acts as threatening 
to kill or to use other severe violence against the victim; threats against third 
persons, such as the victim’s children, also fulfil this criterion. As already mentioned, 
threatening behaviours of all kinds are now included, following the reform in 2000, 
which means that acts such as threatening to smash furniture or to falsely report 
someone to the police also count, as does threatening to perform acts that are legal 
in themselves (such as reporting someone to the police for an offence) if used as 
a means to achieve sexual activity against the other person’s will. It is however not 
required that the person using violence or threats against the victim is the same 
person that performs the sexual activity. For this reason, if someone purchases 
sexual services from someone, knowing that he or she is subject to human trafficking 
and thereby forced into prostitution, this constitutes rape according to sect. 291.
 
In particular, the threatening behaviour alternative raises many demarcation issues, 
although the most unclear alternative may be claimed to be alternative (b), which 
contains the criterion ‘lack of ability to resist’ the sexual activity. The wording 
of this part of the offence is abstract and says little about why the victim was
in this situation.23 The wording of the alternative does specifically mention 
‘unconsciousness’, which covers the most typical situations of being asleep or 
intoxicated (by one’s own means or from being drugged), but the wording includes 
the generally formed alternative ‘or for other reasons’. In addition to the typical cases 
mentioned above, the victim may be unconscious due to an accident or a severe 
physical or mental disability; there is no requirement for a permanent disability. As 
covered in Rt. 1993.963, a woman had become drunk at a Christmas party and followed 
a man to his hotel room. As she lay on the bed vomiting, the man took advantage of 
the situation and penetrated her vagina as she was becoming ill. The Supreme Court 
considered her to have been unable to resist his sexual activity in this situation. 
The criterion also covers cases in which the victim has not had time to register the 
offender’s sexual approach. In one case, Rt. 2012.60, the victim was a teenage girl 
who stood in the bathroom, naked. The offender (her stepfather) approached her 
from behind and inserted a finger into her vagina, which she did not expect. For 
that reason, she had been unable to resist the sexual activity. The criterion is also 
considered to be fulfilled in cases where several elements are present, although none 
in themselves are sufficiently strong to fulfil the criterion. For instance, as covered 
in Rt. 2004.32, a victim had fallen asleep during a car trip due to heavy intoxication. 
She woke up after the driver of the car had pulled over and put his fingers under 
her underwear. She was afraid and confused from having just woken up, with the 
result that the court considered the ‘unable to resist’ criterion to have been fulfilled.
One central question in current debates on the rape offence is how the Norwegian 
regulation relates to instances of so-called freeze situations, where victims lose 
control of themselves. Even though research has helped somewhat to illuminate 
23 See further Jacobsen 2019 pp. 151-230 for a detailed discussion of this alternative in sect. 291.
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this phenomenon,24 we still seem to lack thorough knowledge about it, and 
the relevant criterion in the code is unclear. But given that such reactions do 
indeed occur, we argue that these cases are covered by the ‘lack of ability to resist’ 
criterion.25 The challenges related to proving that the victim was in this kind of 
state, and in particular that the offender knew this, are evident. Generally, the 
already-existing extensions of the rape offence imply that further extensions 
– more or less regardless of by which criteria – will easily be haunted by such 
evidence problems in practice. This recognition has influenced the discussions.
 
The Norwegian rape offence in sect. 291 requires intent (cfr. sect. 21). As elaborated 
above, intent in Norwegian law is a quite extensive concept. According to sect. 
22 letters a-c, it is required for conviction for rape that the offender acted either 
a) with the purpose of raping the victim, i.e. forced the victim to take part in the 
sexual activity despite being aware of a lack of consent, b) considered it as most 
likely that the circumstances are of the kind that constitutes rape, e.g. that victim 
did not consent to the violent intercourse, or c) considered it possible that the 
victim did not consent, or was sleeping etc. and chose to act even if that should 
be the case. As the examples illustrate, cases where the issue of (lack of) intent 
is raised, often concern whether there was a lack of consent from the victim.
 
Should there be a lack of intent in this regard, however, the separate offence in 
sect. 294 on gross negligent rape, enacted in 2000 (see above), supplements the 
rape offence in sect. 291. If for instance the offender believes that the victim 
consents to the sexual activity, but thereby ignores clear indications of her being 
forced by others to do so, intent will be lacking, preventing conviction for rape 
according to sect. 291. However, conviction for gross negligent rape will provide an 
alternative in such a case. Gross negligence according to sect. 23 second paragraph 
requires however that the offender is clearly to be blamed for his misjudgement.
 
As a starting point, rape is punishable with imprisonment between 14 days and 10 
years. Sect. 291, however, raises this frame significantly for the most common kinds 
of sexual activity, such as vaginal, oral or anal intercourse and penetration by the 
use of objects. In such instances, the punishment is three years at a minimum, with 
a maximum of 15 years. In addition, sect. 293 increases the maximum punishment 
to 21 years (the same level as murder in Norwegian law) in particularly serious 
cases of rape, for instance cases where more than one offender carries out the 
sexual activity. Repeat offenders may also be given 21 years imprisonment. We 
should also mention that rape cases where the offender either has previously been 
convicted of rape or is now being convicted of rape on more than one occasion 
24 See e.g., Möller, Söndergaard, and Helström, Tonic immobility during sexual assault – a 
common reaction predicting posttraumatic stress disorder and severe depression, 96 Acta 
Obstertricia et Gynecologica Scandinavia (2017) pp. 932–938.
25 See also Jacobsen 2019 pp. 214-218.
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are strong candidates for preventive detention, which can be prolonged as long as 
the offender is considered dangerous (possibly for life).26 Generally, serious sexual 
offences represent a significant part of cases where preventive detention has been 
the outcome. Gross negligent rape can be punished with imprisonment between 
14 days and six years, or even 10 years in serious cases as mentioned in sect. 293.
 
The expansion of the rape offence that took place prior to the code of 2005 was mainly 
a process where other less serious offences were moved into the expanded rape offence. 
Several important complementary offences exist however also today, including the 
offence of the ‘abuse of unequal power relationships’ found in sect. 295 of the code, 
which covers cases where offenders gain sexual activity for themselves or someone 
else by exploiting the vulnerability of the victim or by misusing a special position, 
such as being the victim’s teacher. Another important offence is sect. 297, which 
covers all cases of sexual acts without consent. This offence can also be used in cases 
of unconsented sexual activity, if for instance the use of violence cannot be proved.
A separate rape offence that applies to children below the age of 14, covered in sect. 
299, is broader than the general rape offence described above. This offence covers 
all instances of performing sexual activity with children under 14, regardless of 
whether the offender uses force or threats, and considers as rape also certain acts that 
would not qualify as ‘sexual activity’, such as the light touching of a child’s genitals.
4. Rape and lack of consent: The debates
4.1 The formation of fronts in criminal policy 
Despite these developments and today’s rather extensive definition of the rape 
offence compared to earlier in history, rape remains a high-profile subject in 
Norway. Key concerns are barriers to reporting, delays in police investigations 
and few prosecutions and convictions. As mentioned, a broad consensus on the 
seriousness of rape seems to exist, as does the view that Norwegian society should 
improve its capacity to prevent and address rape. Contributions to discussion has 
been offered from a wide range of perspectives.27 The need to combat rape has 
been addressed in a series of action plans and other policy documents and is a key 
topic in policy areas such as health, welfare, gender equality, and family and youth 
26 One recent example is HR-2020-976-A.
27 See e.g., Bitsch/Kruse, Bak lukkede dører – en bok om voldtekt [‘Behind closed doors – a book on 
rape’] (Cappelen 2012) and Sveen, ‘Det var ikke voldtekt’ – Ti menn forsvarer seg i retten [‘It was 
not rape’ – Ten men defend themselves in court’] (Spartacus 2019).
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issues.28 The 2008 white paper ‘From words to action’ is an example, with its explicit 
dedication to preventing and prosecuting rape.29 The rape offence and the question 
of whether lack of consent should be sufficient to label an act as rape continue to 
be debated, and this debate is at this point in a deadlock, as we will discuss below.
 
Reforming the rape offence was discussed during several stages in the process that led 
to the code of 2005. The first time such reform was considered was in the white paper 
delivered by the SOC in 1997. As touched upon already, the commission considered 
emphasising the lack of consent in the existing rape offence but also adding a separate 
offence for sexual activity without consent.30 The majority rejected both options, fearing 
in particular that this kind of offence would imply that attention would be turned to 
the victim and his or her behaviour in an unwanted way. The Ministry of Justice and 
the Police then considered the issue in Ot.prp. nr. 28 (1999–2000), as a response to the 
discussion in NOU 1997: 23, and agreed with the majority of the SOC.31 The question 
of the role of consent in the offence was raised once more in Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–
2009), related to the code of 2005.32 At this point, the Ministry of Justice and the Police 
noted that the MC vs Bulgaria judgement from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), in addition to the fact that Sweden had initiated a reform process, called for 
the issue to be considered anew. While emphasising the ‘self-evident and foundational 
idea that all sexual relations should be consensual’ and deserving of protection by 
criminal law, the Ministry of Justice and the Police underlined that doing so was 
not the same as describing all violations of this type as rape.33 At the same time, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Police did not see a practical need to emphasise consent 
in the offence, since it took into account the evidence problems that would occur. 
These considerations essentially contain the rudiments of two distinct positions in 
the debate over the rape offence, both of which contain markedly different views on 
the promise and purpose of criminal law. While the last two decades have seen a 
gradual and extensive expansion of the rape offence, the thresholds for labelling an 
28 For a description of how questions of gender and violence in which rape is included 
have increasingly become prioritised policy areas, see Stefansen, Smette and Dullum, 
The ‘psychological turn’ in self-help services for sexual abuse victims: drivers and 
dilemmas, 27 International Review of Victimology (2021) pp. 80-93. <https://doi.
org/10.1177/0269758020918797>
29 NOU 2008: 4 Fra ord til handling – Bekjempelse av voldtekt krever handling [‘From words to 
action – fighting rape needs action’].
30 Also see NOU 1997: 23 pp. 22–23.
31 Cfr. Ot.prp. nr. 28 (1999–2000) pp. 25–48.
32 Cfr. Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–2009) pp. 219–222.
33 Quotation from Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–2009) p. 219 (our translation).
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act as rape remain high in society.34 The existing changes in the offence have also 
not significantly improved the situation regarding the few convictions for rape that 
have occurred. Evidence-related problems remain a central issue and are expected 
to increase with any further extension of the rape offence, which has led to a general 
viewpoint that might best be described as the ‘practical’ legal point of view.35
 
According to this view, changing the law in this way would not change practice. 
Even today it is claimed, that the difficult thing for the prosecutor is typically to prove 
whether the sexual activity was consensual or not, and, if it is proved that the victim 
did not consent, that the other party understood this. This will not change by removing 
the current additional criteria for rape. Instead, there is a fear that such changes might 
put more emphasis on the victim’s behaviour and also cause new problems from a 
rule-of-law point of view, as these criteria today contribute to demarcate the rape 
offence. Given for instance that cases of intercourse and other forms of penetration 
according to sect. 292 shall be punished by at least 3 years imprisonment (and at most 
21 years cfr. sect. 293), relying on an unclear consent- or voluntariness-requirement is 
particularly problematic. This position has dominated the responses to the different 
proposals and viewpoints concerning reform and has become a recurring theme.
Correspondingly, a different perspective has gradually taken shape in opposition 
to that position that we may call the ‘symbolic’ point of view. While proponents of 
this perspective may agree that a law revision will not necessarily (but may) change 
practice much, their position is that undertaking a consent reform would still serve a 
symbolic function, thus sending a signal about sexual norms in society.36 This position 
emphasises the expressive potential of law, even in situations in which the law as a 
practical tool has proven weak, as well as the symbolic importance of a ‘consent reform’ 
to signal progress and internationalism. International conventions (in particular the 
34 Interestingly enough, many individuals hesitate to apply the label ‘rape’ to their own 
experiences. Experimental studies have shown that when people are asked if they have been 
subjected to acts listed in the rape offence, more people respond yes than when they are asked 
whether they have experienced rape. Stefansen, Løvgren and Frøyland, Making the case for 
‘good enough’ rape-prevalence estimates: insights from a school-based survey experiment 
among Norwegian youths in Rape in the Nordic countries: continuity and change, eds. 
Heinskou, Stefansen and Skilbrei (Routledge 2020) pp. 66–82.
35 For an example of the presentation of a ‘practical’ legal point of view in public debate, 
see Aftenposten, Høyre sier nei til samtykkeparagraf. Høyres svenske søsterparti sier ja. 
(aftenposten.no) [‘The conservative party rejects a consent-based offence. Its Swedish sister 
party, says yes’] 18th December 2017 <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/G1aA44/
hoeyre-sier-nei-til-samtykkeparagraf-hoeyres-svenske-soesterparti-sier-j>(accessed 15th 
December 2020).  
36 For an example of the argument that the symbolic importance of the law is an independent 
argument for a law revision, see Nordlie, Fynh, Prohic, Zeinalzadeh, Hassan,Torbo and Thom, 
En samtykkelov kunne dømt ham som voldtok meg ‘A consent law could have convicted he 
who raped me]. Agenda Magasin 17th September 2020 <https://agendamagasin.no/debatt/
ensamtykkelov-kunne-domt-ham-som-voldtok-meg/> (accessed 14th December 2020).
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Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence, Istanbul Convention), critique of the Norwegian rape offence 
from international bodies,37 and not least developments in Swedish criminal law38 
have spurred a call for a consent-based offence in Norwegian law as well. This call 
builds on an argument that a disjunction exists between how rape is defined and 
discussed in public discourse and how the law is defined, interpreted and applied 
in the criminal justice system, an understanding that has led to the claim that a law 
revision should be undertaken in order to align the social and legal definitions of 
rape.39
As these fronts have become established, they have also gradually become politicised, 
in the sense that the different viewpoints are attached to different political groups. The 
practial point of view has become related to the right/conservative/liberals, while the 
symbolic approach to the issue has become particularly related to the left. The issue came 
to a head when a representative proposal was submitted in 2017 by four representatives 
from the Socialist Left Party, who called for a change in the wording of the rape offence 
to lack of oppriktig samtykke: ‘a genuine consent’.40 The government, then consisting of 
the Conservative Party and the populist right-wing Progress Party, rejected this call, 
while other factions had less resolute rejections.41 The left’s proposal was surprisingly 
specific and seemingly without much ‘intentional depth’. The proposers, for example, 
seemed to be unaware that the Swedish reform rejected applying lack of ‘consent’ and 
instead had opted for a voluntariness alternative. (The proposers were not alone in 
their lack of knowledge: the Norwegian debates generally reflected little insight into 
the Swedish reform, despite the topic arising on several occasions.) The firm rejection 
from the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, on its hand, cannot be described as 
being particularly openminded, even if criticising the left’s alternative was easy to do.
 
As mentioned above, at no point have the various parties disagreed over the principled 
view that sexual contact should be voluntary; the disagreement has only been concerned 
with what implication that outlook should have for the rape offence. The criminal 
justice system seems firmly embedded in a practice point of view, strongly embraced 
37 See e.g., Hennum, Den rettslige behandlingen av voldtekt - hvorfor har Norge fått kritikk fra FN? 
[‘The legal handling of rape – Why has Norway been criticised by the UN?’], available at www.
krisesenter.com (accessed 15th January 2021).
38 Dir: 2008: 94, which initiated the Swedish reform, was already noted in Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–
2009) p. 219. 
39 Amnesty International, Europe: time for change: justice for rape survivors in the Nordic 
countries (Amnesty International 2019), available at <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
eur01/0089/2019/en/> (accessed 14th July 2020).
40 Dokument 8:96 S (2017–2018), Representantforslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Petter Eide, 
Kari Elisabeth Kaski, Nicholas Wilkinson og Karin Andersen om endringer i straffeloven med 
sikte på at voldtekt blir definert som seksuell omgang uten oppriktig samtykke (proposal for 
changes in the definition of rape in the Penal code).
41 Innst. 188 S 2017–2018 (preparatory work).
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 2/2020
91
also by some politicians, while the reformers are clearly settled in a simplified symbolic 
point of view. How does this difference reflect the public discussions in Norway? 
4.2 The larger context: Norwegian society, the women’s movement and the rape 
issue
 
The background to these more distinctly legal discussions is that broader debates 
about how Norwegian society should define and approach rape have been ongoing 
for the last four decades and have been a priority politically for the last two.42 In this 
case, the broader context for understanding the trajectory and outcome of debates 
about rape law is the history and strength of the women’s movement in Norway and 
how the movement has turned to the state to seek redress for harms that may be 
considered gendered, including asking for stronger legal protection of sexual integrity. 
This state of affairs has been made possible by how the Norwegian state typically takes 
an interventionist approach to issues that are generally considered private in other 
empirical contexts.43 This influence also goes in the other direction: the contemporary 
Norwegian state and its priorities are also a result of how social movements such as 
the women’s movement have pushed and entered into allegiances with the state to 
further their agenda and to secure state protection and involvement, creating what 
Helga Hernes famously termed ‘state feminism’ in 1987.44 The women’s movement 
in Norway firmly placed the issue of rape on the agenda, and civil society actors 
within the movement organised to promote preventive measures, victims’ assistance 
and criminal justice from the mid-1970s on.45 In Norway, as elsewhere, this was an 
attempt to reformulate gendered and sexualised harms to be public concerns in need 
of public solutions, not private problems that people settle amongst themselves.46 
While it is neither novel nor exclusive to Norway that interest groups have turned to 
the law to achieve their goals of societal change,47 what is special to Norway is that 
42 Skjørten, Bakketeig, Bjørnholt and Mossige, Vold i nære relasjoner: et felt i bevegelse 
[‘Domestic violence: a field in motion’] in Vold i nære relasjoner: forståelser, konsekvenser og 
tiltak, eds. Skjørten, Bakketeig, Bjørnholt and Mossige (Universitetsforlaget 2019) pp. 13–29.
43 For an analysis of the relationship between feminism, law and the state in the Nordic countries, 
see Gunnarsson, Svensson and Davies, Reflecting the epistemology of law – exploring 
boundaries in Exploiting the limits of law: Swedish feminism and the challenge to pessimism, eds. 
Gunnarsson, Svensson and Davis (Ashgate 2007) pp. 1–16.
44 Hernes, Welfare state and woman power: essays in state feminism (Norwegian University Press 
1987).
45 Skjørten, Kvinnemishandling – kunnskap og politikk [‘Abuse of women – knowledge and 
politics’], 28 Kvinneforskning (2004) pp. 63–75. A central legal theoretical work is Stang 
Dahl, Pene piker haiker ikke: artikler om kvinnerett, strafferett og velferdsstat [‘Nice girls do not 
hitchhike: Articles on women’s law, criminal law and the welfare state’] (Universitetsforlaget 
1994).
46 Carmody and Carrington, Preventing sexual violence?, 33 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology (2000) pp. 341–361.
47 Sutton, Law/society: origins, interactions, and change (Pine Forge Press/SAGE 2001). 
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the women’s movement was so successful in the juridification of gender relations and 
the protection of sexual integrity.48 Taken together, the interventions of the women’s 
movement in Norway have taken part in changing how rape and victimisation are 
understood. Legal definitions of rape have changed considerably in many countries 
in the last few decades and this is due to how first the women’s movement and later 
mainstream politics have debated how best to take the offence of rape seriously. 
Norway thus serves as an example of a country where legislators are involved in 
what McGlynn and Munro describe as ‘an almost incessant process of consultation 
and legislative “tinkering” as new initiatives are developed to address old problems, 
often with disappointing, limited or unintended counter-productive results’.49
As mentioned above, several strands of concerns or debates over rape have occurred 
over the last few decades. The strength of the various debates varies, something which 
should be seen in relation to the development of welfare and criminal justice approaches. 
Debates in the 1970s were generally oriented towards understanding the kinds of acts 
that rape and other forms of sexual crimes are. The feminist movement demonstrated 
the harms of rape for victims but also moved contemporary understandings of rape 
away from hegemonic biological and pathological perspectives, instead bringing to the 
fore sociological explanations that emphasised how rape does not necessarily mean 
a break from sexuality and gender norms but instead builds on them.50 As the cause 
of rape came to be considered sociological more than biological or psychological, the 
need for individual rehabilitation became less self-evident.51 The women’s movement 
expanded the scope of what politicians and the criminal justice system were expected 
to address. If the reason that rape takes place lies in how gender, power and sexuality 
are linked on a societal level, then the solution is to change society, not the individual. 
We must understand this aspect of the trajectory of the debates and definitions in 
order to understand the role and potential of the criminal justice system and the 
heightened importance of the definition of rape, and hence the strength of the 
position that the symbolic function of law alone warrants law revisions in debates.
48 Gunnarsson, Svensson and Davies 2007 pp. 1–16.
49 McGlynn and Munro, Rethinking rape law: an introduction in Rethinking rape law: 
international and comparative perspectives, eds. McGlynn and Munro (Routledge 2019) pp. 
1–14, p. 1.
50 McKinnon, Toward a feminist theory of the state (Harvard University Press 1989). For an 
overview of feminist perspectives on sexual violence in Scandinavia research, see Bjørnholt, 
Theorising sexual violence in intimate relations in Scandinavia: a literature review in Rape in 
the Nordic Countries: Continuity and Change, eds. Heinskou, Skilbrei and Stefansen (Routledge 
2020) pp. 18-32.
51 For a description and analysis of the trajectory of theorising sexual offending, see Kruse, 
The Why, the Who and the Wherefore. Explanations, self-change and social friction in men’s 
narratives of sexual violations (University of Oslo 2020).
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 2/2020
93
5. Analysis and outlook
The act of rape have received extraordinary attention in recent years. Most other acts 
in the criminal code are not debated as often, nor as broadly or as heatedly. Other 
aspects of how society approaches rape receive very little debate, such as preventive 
measures directed at convicted persons or the provision of health services and support 
for victims. As mentioned in the introduction, the legal definition has received a great 
deal of attention in the Norwegian context, which must be seen in connection to 
how the formulation of the penal code holds such an important symbolic function 
and is generally considered key to solving normative and practical problems for the 
prosecution and victims.52
 
At the same time, the case of Norway illustrates some particular features of more 
general interest. The gradual reform steps taken, leading to a quite extensive rape 
offence, considering rape as highly serious in terms of sentences, have so to speak 
made the issue of further reform appear as symbolic only. The current offence, even if 
fundamentally of the violence or force kind, has been broadened to the extent that it 
can be hard to identify many practical instances which are not already considered as 
rape today, but which should be included. As a consent reform most likely would not 
solve the evidence problems often faced in such cases, these reasons have, in a context 
dominated by pragmatic perspectives, left the case for reform wanting for sufficient 
good reasons to be convincing – leaving the entire debate in deadlock for some time now. 
The previous reform addressing many of the objections to the law that today are at the 
apex of other countries’ reforms, implies that the Norwegian discussion now appears 
to require more detailed premises on the current regulation and reform alternatives 
and their implications, to move forward. As an example, it is clear to us that the 
current rape offence is a result of several reform processes that in turn have resulted in 
a somewhat unbalanced ‘division of labour’ between the rape offence and other sexual 
offences and terminology that has not necessarily been well thought through. Instead 
of further ‘tinkering’53 with the rape offence, we argue that it should be subjected to 
a more thorough reform. For instance, there appears to be a too significant gap and a 
‘make or break’-effect between sect. 291 and sect. 297: Where the prosecutor cannot 
prove that the criteria in sect. 291 is fulfilled, sect. 297 is in many cases the alternative. 
If the case concerns for instance intercourse, this implies that the sentencing frame 
is reduced from 3-15 years of imprisonment, to imprisonment for maximum 1 year. 
Even if sect. 295 in some instances is an alternative, a more systematically designed set 
52 For a discussion of this subject, see Walklate, Fitz-Gibbon and McCulloch, Is more law the 
answer? Seeking justice for victims of intimate partner violence through the reform of legal 
categories, 18 Criminology & Criminal Justice (2017) pp. 115–131.
53 McGlynn and Munro 2019 pp. 1–14. p. 1.
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of offences would make the law more coherent, allowing for more nuanced solutions.54
 
The key to overcome the polarisation of the debate is to acknowledge that law has 
both a practical side – which means that acts must be formulated in a way that will 
make police investigations and legal reasoning and decision-making possible – and 
a symbolic side, which communicates societal values and draws boundaries. While 
some have argued that feminists and others who emphasise the symbolic power of 
the law are naive,55 other possible effects of such a signal also warrant consideration. 
Furthermore, both the practical and symbolic side of the offence relate to broader 
questions such as what should count as rape in the first place, how important is it to 
differentiate between different forms of violations of an individual’s sexual autonomy, 
how can we ensure that young people develop respect for their own and others’ sexuality, 
how should we punish rape, and generally; how can we promote sexual autonomy?
 
The above-mentioned questions are big and complex. But they offer an opportunity for 
Norwegian law, politics, and society at large to rethink, gain more knowledge of, and 
significantly advance our ideas and understanding of such issues, and perhaps change 
cultures too. Simple messages can be powerful, but so too can nuances. They can help us 
to implement important principles and values into different contexts and thereby also 
lead to more sound judgements of how to act, which this after all in the end is all about. In 
this way, instead of the dichotomy reform or not, which dominates the discussion today, 
we should enter a more open-minded process, considering different alternatives and 
their strength and weaknesses, in view of the deeper issues of principles and challenges 
for sexual ethics for our time. Questions relating for instance to youth sexuality, as 
for example the challenges they face in a highly sexualised social context, should be 
given strong attention. So should the fact that the rape offence in criminal law should 
not be the sole reference point and standard for sexual ethics and wrongs in general.
While the existence of Norway’s two opposing fronts might have caused deadlock over 
the issue, the situation shows signs of a loosening. The voting over the 2017 proposal 
showed some politicians taking a more nuanced approach. The recent Government 
action plan has also acknowledged the need for such a broader reform.56 That means 
that there along the political spectrum today are a much broader case for reform – of 
some kind. In this regard, analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the reforms 
already carried out in other countries, including our Nordic neighbours, as well as 
our own extensive history of reforms in this area, can be utilised. 
 
